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A RELUCTANT STANCE BY THE INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE: THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE
OF THE USE OF THE SECTION 2503(b)' ANNUAL
GIFT EXCLUSION FOLLOWING CRUMMEY AND
CRISTOFANP
Pam and her husband, Nick, have decided to create an ir-
revocable living trust to benefit their three children and seven
grandchildren. They both want to take advantage of the
$10,000 annual gift exclusion under section 2503(b) of the In-
ternal Revenue Code.' Under this section, Pam and Nick may
each contribute up to $10,000 per year (a total of $20,000) to
each trust beneficiary without gift tax consequences. Pam and
Nick have named their three children as primary beneficiaries
and have given their seven grandchildren contingent remain-
der interests in the trust. The trust agreement expressly pro-
vides that any of the three children or the seven grandchildren
may withdraw funds from the trust. However, they must do
so within thirty days of any trust contribution or forfeit their
ability to withdraw funds from that contribution.
In 1995, 1996, and 1997, Pam and Nick transferred a
combined sum of $200,000 to the trust annually. Thus,
$20,000 had been given to each of the ten beneficiaries named
in the trust ($10,000 from Pam, $10,000 from Nick) each year.
It is now 1998, and Pam and Nick have successfully trans-
ferred a total of $600,000 to the trust over the past three years.
Each year, both Pam and Nick had claimed ten annual exclu-
sions of $10,000 ($100,000 total) under section 2503(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
With respect to the seven grandchildren, however, the In-
ternal Revenue Service maintains that Pam and Nick were
not eligible to take advantage of the section 2503(b) annual
gift exclusion in each of the past three years. Thus, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service alleges a $210,000 deficiency in the Fed-
eral gift tax of both Pam and Nick for this three year period (a
1. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1997).
2. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968).
3. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74
(1991).
4. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1997).
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total of $420,000).' The Internal Revenue Service maintains:
(1) that there is no express agreement as to whether the grand-
children could make a present demand of trust funds; (2) that
the contributions to the trust do not constitute gifts of "present
interest"; and (3) that Pam and Nick named the grandchil-
dren as beneficiaries only to take advantage of the $10,000
section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion.
As to the seven grandchildren, should the court allow
Pam and Nick to exclude $210,000 of the $300,000 they each
transferred to the trust between 1995 and 1997? Or, is the In-
ternal Revenue Service justified in disallowing the section
2503(b) annual gift exclusions? Considering the Internal
Revenue Service's unwillingness to accept the reasoning be-
hind the "Crummey power"' and its recent indication that fu-
ture use of section 2503(b) will be challenged, the answers are
uncertain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the decision in Crummey v. Commissioner,7 indi-
vidual taxpayers may make valid inter vivos8 gift transfers
using the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion under section
2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. The only limitation on
this taxpayer benefit is that contingent beneficiaries named
in the trust must have either the present "right to enjoy" or a
legal right to the trust property.9 Using the Crummey with-
5. To clarify, Pam and Nick transferred a combined total of $20,000 for
each of the ten beneficiaries of the trust ($20,000 x 10= $200,000). With respect
to the seven grandchildren, Pam and Nick each claimed an annual gift exclu-
sion of $70,000 three years in a row ((7 grandchildren x $10,000) x 3 years =
$210,000). This represents the $210,000 deficiency alleged by the IRS for both
Pam and Nick (a $420,000 total).
6. The term "Crummey power" originated from the Crummey v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue decision. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). "Crummey power" refers to a strategy in
which annual exclusions are granted for gifts of property made to primary and
contingent beneficiaries through an irrevocable trust. Owen J. Fiore & John F.
Ramsbacher, Crummey Powers for Contingent Beneficiaries OK'd, EST.
PLANNING, Jan. 1992, at 10.
7. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968).
8. "Between the living; from one living person to another... an ordinary
gift from one person to another.., to distinguish it from a gift made in con-
templation of death or a testamentary gift." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 821 (6th
ed. 1990).
9. In determining whether the gift is one of "present interest," emphasis
should be placed on the donee's right to enjoy the gift rather than actual enjoy-
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drawal power and a lenient interpretation of section
2503(b)," a greater amount of an individual taxpayer's
wealth may be transferred to his or her family.11 Inter vivos
transfers among family members based on the Crummey
withdrawal power can serve as a beneficial element of family
estate planning. 2
The creation of a trust arrangement as a medium for in-
ter vivos transfers provides several benefits to the donor."
First, the donor is able to retain significant control over
which individuals are named in the trust and the amount of
property or money that is annually contributed to it.4 Sec-
ond, inter vivos transfers by way of a trust arrangement may
have the effect of minimizing the donor's tax liability. 5 Be-
fore 1996, a donor taxpayer could use section 2503(b), as in-
terpreted through the Crummey" and Estate of Cristofani v.
Commissioner v decisions, to annually exclude $10,000 from
federal gift tax for each beneficiary named in the trust."
However, in 1996, the Service issued Technical Advisory
Memorandum 96280049 which suggests that taxpayer ability
to use section 2503(b) may be more heavily scrutinized.0
Consequently, it is of great importance that identifiable re-
quirements regarding use of the section 2503(b) annual ex-
clusion are established to ensure donor taxpayers lawfully
employ section 2503(b).2'
Proponents of the Crummey power assert that there is
only one limitation that the Internal Revenue Service
("Internal Revenue Service" or "Service") places on the use of
the section 2503(b) gift exclusion-that the gift cannot be one
ment of the gift. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d
118, 121 (7th Cir. 1951).
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.
11. Fiore & Ramsbacher, supra note 7, at 10.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968).
17. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74
(1991).
18. See discussion infra Part II.B-C.
19. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9628004 (July 30, 1996).
20. See discussion infra Part II.E.
21. See discussion infra Part V.
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of a future interest. However, because the definition of a fu-
ture interest offered by the Service is so complex, there has
been significant controversy in determining whether trust
contributions are considered gifts of a present interest or
gifts of a future interest.2 In analyzing whether a taxpayer
can use the section 2503(b) exclusion, different standards
have developed for determining whether a gift of a present
interest has been made.24
The most prominent standard to determine whether a
gift of a present interest has been made is the "right to enjoy"
or legal right test. 5 The "right to enjoy" or legal right test
employed by the Ninth Circuit in Crummey" and the tax
court in Cristofani27 mandates that the beneficiary have an
unrestricted legal right to make a present demand of trust
property in order for the taxpayer to take advantage of the
section 2503(b) annual exclusion.28 An alternative to the
"right to enjoy" or legal right test is the "summation of the
factors" test. 9 The "summation of the factors" test focuses on
a multitude of factors, including the language of the trust
agreement, the age of the beneficiaries, the intent of the do-
nor in creating the trust, and the circumstances surrounding
the formation of the trust, to determine whether a taxpayer
22. The tax regulations define "future interest" for the purposes of section
2503(a) as follows:
(a) No part of the value of a gift of a future interest may be excluded in
determining the total amount of gifts made during the "calendar pe-
riod". "Future interest" is a legal term, and includes reversions, re-
mainders, and other interests or estates, whether vested or contingent,
and whether or not supported by a particular interest or estate, which
are limited to commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at some fu-
ture date or time. The term has no reference to such contractual
rights as exist in a bond, note (though bearing no interest until matur-
ity), or in a policy of life insurance, the obligations of which are to be
discharged by payments in the future. But a future interest or inter-
ests in such contractual obligations may be created by the limitations
contained in a trust or other instrument of transfer used in effecting a
gift.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3 (1997).
23. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
24. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.l.a-c, IV.B.2.
25. See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
26. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968).
27. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74
(1991).
28. See discussion infra Part IV.B.l.a-c.
29. See discussion infra Part II.D.4.
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can utilize the section 2503(b) annual exclusion.30
In publishing its Technical Advisory Memorandum
("TAM") 9628004,"' the Service has indicated that it intends
to challenge the current application of the section 2503(b)
annual gift exclusion as interpreted in the Crummey deci-
sion." The Internal Revenue Service has supported its cur-
rent interpretation of the section 2503(b) annual gift exclu-
sion via the Crummey power by arguing "substance over
form."3 When determining whether the section 2503(b) an-
nual gift exclusion has been lawfully used, the Service as-
serts that the "substance" rather than the "form" of a trust
arrangement employing section 2503(b) via the Crummey
power should control.' By challenging the use of the section
2503(b) annual gift exclusion in certain situations,33 the
Service is attempting to eradicate any type of taxpayer abuse
to which section 2503(b) might be subjected.3"
While the Service's concern about taxpayer abuse of sec-
tion 2503(b) through the Crummey power is understandable,
current standards for determining lawful use of the section
2503(b) annual gift exclusion remain inadequate. As such,
specific legislative guidelines created according to the deci-
sions in Crummey and Cristofani must be developed to en-
sure proper taxpayer use of the section 2503(b) annual gift
exclusion.37
Specifically, this comment will focus on the Service's con-
tinued adherence to the Crummey interpretation of the sec-
tion 2503(b) annual gift exclusion. Support for this interpre-
tation of section 2503(b) is based on factors such as the
beneficiaries' awareness of the ability to demand trust prop-
erty,3 the advantage of the "legal right" standard in deter-
mining present interest, 9 and different policy considerations
supporting the Crummey interpretation of the section 2503(b)
annual gift exclusion."' Thus, the objective of this comment is
30. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
31. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9628004 (July 30, 1996).
32. See discussion infra Part II.E.1.
33. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9628004 (July 30, 1996).
34. Id.
35. See discussion infra Part II.E.1.
36. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
37. See discussion infra Part V.
38. See discussion infra Part V.A.
39. See discussion infra Part IV.B.1-3.
40. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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to propose model legislation in order ensure that the inter-
pretation of section 2503(b) stays faithful to the factors high-
lighted above.
Accordingly, this comment is organized as follows. Part
II, the background section, will trace the development of the
courts' interpretation of the annual gift exclusion, concluding
with the present uncertainty created by the Service concern-
ing taxpayer use of section 2503(b).' Part III outlines the le-
gal issue that has been created by the Service's new position
regarding the leveraged use of the section 2503(b) annual gift
exclusion by way of the Crummey power.4 2  Part IV, the
analysis section, illustrates the need for legislative guidelines
to eliminate taxpayer confusion regarding the Service's cur-
rent position regarding section 2503(b). 4' Finally, Part V
proposes legislative guidelines to serve as a framework for
proper taxpayer use of the section 2503(b) annual gift exclu-
sion." This proposed legislation aims to reduce the possibil-
ity of future tax litigation regarding a taxpayer's use of sec-
tion 2503(b).
II. BACKGROUND
A. Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code: An
Introduction
The Internal Revenue Service allows a donor taxpayer to
exclude the first $10,000 of any gift made to a donee during
the calendar year in which the gift is made." The provision
allowing the donor taxpayer to take the $10,000 annual gift
exclusion is section 2503(b). 6 Section 2503(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides:
In the case of gifts (other than gifts of a future interests in
property) made to any person by the donor during the cal-
endar year, the first $10,000 of such gifts to such person
shall not, for purposes of subsection (a), be included in the
total amount of gifts made during such year. Where there
has been a transfer to any person of a present interest in
41. See discussion infra Part II.
42. See discussion infra Part III.
43. See discussion infra Part IV.
44. See discussion infra Part V.
45. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1997).
46. Id.
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property, the possibility that such interest may be dimin-
ished by the exercise of a power shall be disregarded in
applying this subsection, if no part of such interest will at
47
any time pass to any other person.
Donors invoking the use of the Crummey power to take
advantage of the taxpayer benefits under section 2503(b) are
attempting to apply the $10,000 annual gift exclusion to both
present and contingent beneficiaries created through an ir-
revocable trust.4 The language of section 2503(b) states no
limitation on the number of exclusions a donor may take
when contributing to an irrevocable trust, as long as the do-
nor has not given a gift of a future interest.49 From a textual
standpoint, a donor who has named numerous beneficiaries
to the income or corpus of the trust has the capability of ex-
cluding a large proportion of any contribution made to the
trust.
50
B. "Crummey" Powers: An Application of the Section
2503(b) Annual Gift Exclusion
In 1968, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided
Crummey v. Commissioner.5' Crummey involved the creation
of an irrevocable living trust by the trustor parents for the
benefit of their four children.52 Each trustor parent filed a
separate gift tax return for each year in which money was
contributed to the trust.5 Of specific importance, language in
the trust agreement indicated that each child named in the
47. Id. The donor taxpayer is able to exclude a greater portion of any trust
contribution from federal gift tax by naming a greater number of individuals as
beneficiaries to the trust. Id.
48. Fiore & Ramsbacher, supra note 7, at 10.
49. I.R.C § 2503(b) (1997).
50. Id.
51. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968).
52. Id. at 83-87.
53. Id at 83. The primary dispute revolved around the tax years of 1962
and 1963. Id. On December 31, 1962, the respective ages of the beneficiaries
were as follows: John Knowles Crummey, 22; Janet Sheldon Crummey, 20;
David Clarke Crummey, 15; Mark Clifford Crummey, 11. Id. at 82. On Decem-
ber 31, 1963, the respective ages of the beneficiaries were as follows: John
Knowles Crummey, 23; Janet Sheldon Crummey, 21; David Clarke Crummey
16; Mark Clifford Crummey, 12. Id. The original contribution to the trust was
$50.00. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 82 (9th
Cir. 1968). Subsequent contributions to the trust were as follows: $4,267.77 on
June 20, 1962; $49,550.00 on December 15, 1962; $12,797.81 on December 19,
1963. Id. at 83.
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trust had the present ability to demand an immediate cash
withdrawal from the trust.
4
Focusing on the issue of whether or not the trustors gave
a present interest to their minor children so as to qualify for
the section 2503(b) exclusion,55 the Ninth Circuit concluded
that postponed enjoyment is not equivalent to a "future in-
terest" if the postponement is caused solely by the minority of
the beneficiary.56 Employing the "Perkins Test,"57 the Crum-
mey court held that a demand on the trust funds by any of
the beneficiaries may not be resisted and, thus, all contribu-
tions to the trust were gifts of a present interest.5 As a re-
sult, the parent trustors were allowed all the section 2503(b)
exclusions for the two-year period in which they had contrib-
uted to the trust.5 The Ninth Circuit came to the conclusion
that, under these circumstances, each named beneficiary of
the trust had the present ability to demand funds from the
trust.
60
54. The relevant language of the "demand" provision of the trust agreement
stated:
With respect to such additions, each child of the trustors may demand
at any time (up to and including December 31 of the year in which a
transfer to his or her Trust has been made) the sum of Four Thousand
Dollars ($4,000.00) or the amount of the transfer from each donor,
whichever is less, payable in cash immediately upon receipt by the
Trustee of the demand in writing and in any event, not later than De-
cember 31 in the year in which such transfer was made. Such payment
shall be made from the gift of that donor for that year. If a child is a
minor at the time of such gift of that donor for that year, or fails in le-
gal capacity for any reason, the child's guardian may make such de-
mand on behalf of the child.
Id.
55. Id. at 83-84.
56. Id.
57. Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601 (1956). The
tax court in Perkins concluded a contribution to a trust will be considered a gift
of a present interest as long as any present demand of trust property by a bene-
ficiary may not be legally resisted. Id. at 606.
58. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th
Cir. 1968).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 87. First, a beneficiary demands her share of the trust property.
See id. If a minor, the trustee would petition the court for the appointment of a
legal guardian and then turn the funds over to the guardian. Id. The parent
might also be able to make the demand as the natural guardian. Id. This,
however, would involve the acquisition, rather than management, of the trust
property. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 87 (9th
Cir. 1968). If the property was acquired, the appointment of a legal guardian to
take charge of the funds would be necessary. Id.
596 [Vol. 38
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The Internal Revenue Service asserted that the section
2503(b) gift exclusion should apply only to those beneficiaries
who were most likely to make an effective demand of funds
from the trust.6 Although conceding that those beneficiaries
who were not of majority did have "paper rights" to the trust
funds,62 the Service argued that the minor beneficiaries
lacked the capacity to appoint an agent to make a demand on
the trust funds or to sue if a question arose as to the benefi-
ciaries' legal right to the trust funds.13 Taking the above ar-
guments into account, the Crummey court reasoned that it
would be arbitrary and unfair to enable the Service to decide
which beneficiaries will or will not be likely to make an effec-
tive demand of the trust funds.'
C. The Impact of Cristofani: An Extension of the Crummey
Power
In 1991, the tax court rendered a unanimous decision in
Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner.65 Cristofani involved a
decedent who had created an irrevocable inter vivos trust to
which she contributed property two years before her death.6
The primary beneficiaries of the trust were the decedent's
two children, while the decedent's five grandchildren held
contingent remainder interests in the trust. 7 A provision in
the trust provided that both the primary and contingent
beneficiaries had the unrestricted right to withdraw an
amount from the trust not to exceed the amount of the an-
61. Id. at 89.
62. Id. at 87.
63. Id. It should be noted that the beneficiary petitioners attempted to re-
fute the above argument by asserting that all minors above the age of 14 had
the ability to make a demand on the trust because they had the capacity to ap-
point a legal guardian. Id. The petitioners also argued that, as natural guardi-
ans, their parents (trustors) had the ability to make a demand of the trust
funds (for the beneficiaries) by appointing a legal guardian to receive the prop-
erty. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 87 (9th Cir.
1968).
64. Id. at 87-88. The court found nothing to indicate that it was any more
likely that a twenty-three year old beneficiary would demand trust funds than
any of the younger beneficiaries. Id. at 88. Although it may be easier for an
older beneficiary to make a demand for the trust funds, none of the four chil-
dren could be resisted in their demand for trust funds. Id.
65. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74
(1991).
66. Id. at 75.
67. Id.
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nual gift tax exclusion.68
At the time the will was executed, the primary benefici-
aries (parents) were the legal guardians of their respective
minor children and there was no indication of independently
appointed guardians of the contingent beneficiaries'
(children) property.69 Furthermore, the decedent had signed
a power of attorney that named the primary beneficiaries of
the trust as the decedent's attorneys in fact.7"
The decedent had intended to fund the corpus7 of the
trust with 100% ownership of improved real property that
was to be transferred into the trust during each of three tax-
able years." In accordance with her original intent, the dece-
dent transferred a 33% interest to the trust via quitclaim
deed recorded in 1984, and a second 33% interest in the
property, also through quitclaim deed, in 1985."8 The dece-
dent intended to transfer the final 33% interest in the prop-
erty to the trust in 1986. 74 However, prior to the transfer, the
decedent died and the remaining 33% interest in the property
remained in her estate."
The decedent failed to report the two $70,000 transfers
on her Federal gift tax return.6  Instead, the decedent
68. Id. at 75-76. "Article Twelfth" of the trust mandated that, following a
contribution to the trust, either of the primary beneficiaries has the power to
withdraw an amount not to exceed the amount specified under the section
2503(b) gift tax exclusion ($10,000) within fifteen days of each contribution. Id.
"Article Twelfth" also stated that each of the contingent beneficiaries possessed
the same right of withdrawal as the primary beneficiaries. Id. at 76. In addi-
tion, "Article Third" stated that the trustees, in their discretion, could apply as
much of the principal of the trust as necessary for the proper support, health,
maintenance, and education of the primary beneficiaries. Estate of Cristofani
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74, 76 (1991). In exercising their
discretion, the trustees were to take into account several factors, which in-
cluded the "settlor's desire to consider the primary beneficiaries of primary im-
portance and the contingent beneficiaries of secondary importance." Id.
69. Id. at 75-76.
70. Id. at 75.
71. "Corpus" is defined as the "principal sum or capital" of the trust.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 343 (6th ed. 1990).
72. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74, 77
(1991). The sole piece of property in question was a lot containing a warehouse,
which the court entitled the "Spring Street property." Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Each of the two prior transfers of property were valued at $70,000
at the time of the transfer. Id.
76. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74, 77
(1991).
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claimed seven annual $10,000 exclusions under section
2503(b) for each year in which an interest in property was
transferred to the trust.77 Although allowing the decedent to
claim the annual exclusions with respect to her two children,
the Service disallowed the exclusions claimed with respect to
each of the decedent's five grandchildren. The Service
claimed that the transfers with respect to the decedent's five
grandchildren were not transfers of a present interest in the
property."8
Distinguishing Crummey,9 the Service asserted that in
Crummey the trust beneficiary children possessed both the
immediate power of withdrawal and the future benefit in the
trust corpus and income." In the instant case, the Service
argued that language contained in the trust documents indi-
cated that the decedent had intended her two children to be
the primary beneficiaries while her grandchildren were con-
sidered beneficiaries of secondary importance.8 In holding
for the decedent, the Cristofani court interpreted Crummey"
to mean that beneficiaries of a trust do not need a vested pre-
sent interest or vested remainder interest in the trust corpus
or income in order to qualify for the section 2503(b) exclu-
sion.' Disregarding a standard that focused on the likelihood
that the beneficiaries would exercise their right to the trust
funds, the Cristofani court focused on the legal ability of the
beneficiary to withdraw property from the trust.' The
Cristofani court concluded that each grandchild possessed
77. Id. at 75-77 (1991). Decedent claimed an exclusion for each of her two
children as well as for each of her five grandchildren and, as a result, the dece-
dent was able to exclude the entire value of the transferred property from fed-
eral gift tax in 1984 and 1985. Id.
78. Id. at 77. The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the exclusions for
both 1984 and 1985. Id. As a result, the Internal Revenue Service increased
the decedent's adjusted taxable gifts from $70,000 to $100,000. Id. at 78.
79. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968).
80. Id. at 87-88.
81. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 88. "Article Third" of the trust indicated that the
trustees could apply as much of the principal of the trust as necessary to take
care of the decedent's children. Id. In exercising their discretion, the trustees
were to take into account different factors, including "the Settlor's desire to
consider the Settlor's children as primary beneficiaries and the other benefici-
aries of secondary importance." Id.
82. Id. at 88.
83. Id. at 80-83.
84. Id.
19981 599
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the legal right to withdraw funds from the trust and the ap-
pointed trustees could not legally resist a withdrawal de-
mand by any of the grandchildren.85
Additionally, the Service argued that because the grand-
children possessed only a contingent remainder interest in
the trust, the decedent only intended to benefit her two chil-
dren as primary beneficiaries and not her grandchildren as
contingent beneficiaries.86 However, solidifying its decision to
allow the section 2503(b) exclusion for the grandchildren, the
Cristofani court determined that provisions in the trust and
the grandchildren's ability to withdraw funds from the trust
for a limited period of time indicated that the decedent in-
tended to benefit her grandchildren. 7
D. Differing Standards Used to Determine Whether a Trust
Contribution May Be Considered a Gift of a "Present
Interest"
1. The General Requirement: Contributions to a Trust
Must Be a Gift of a Present Interest
Under section 2503(b), a donor may only take the annual
$10,000 gift exclusion if the contribution is a gift of a present
interest.88 A contribution to a trust is considered a gift of a
present interest only if the beneficiary for whom the contri-
bution has been made is not limited as to when he or she may
enjoy the trust property. 9 In accordance with the section
2503(b) requirement that a gift of a present interest be made,
several different standards have been employed to determine
85. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74,
81-83 (1991).
86. Id.
87. Id. As remaindermen, the grandchildren's benefits were contingent
upon one of the primary beneficiaries dying before the decedent died or failing
to survive the decedent by more than 120 days. Id. Although both primary
beneficiaries were in good health at the time the trust was executed, the court
indicated that the possibility existed that the primary beneficiaries could pre-
decease the decedent. Id. at 80-83. Regarding the grandchildren's present
ability to withdraw funds from the trust, the Cristofani court focused on the
grandchildren's present ability to withdraw funds from the trust up to the
amount allowable by the section 2503(b) exclusion. Id. Although the grand-
children never exercised the right to withdraw, it did not negate the fact that
they did have the right to do so within fifteen days following a contribution to
the trust by the decedent. Estate of Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 80-83.
88. I.R.C § 2503(b) (1997).
89. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3 (1997).
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what constitutes a gift of a present interest.9"
2. Current Standard
The current standard used to determine whether a con-
tribution to a trust may be considered a gift of a present in-
terest is whether the beneficiaries have a legal right to make
a present demand of the trust property.9' The Crummey92 and
Cristofani9" decisions set out certain criteria to determine
whether a gift of a present interest has been made. Relying
on the Perkins Test9" and "right to enjoy" standard estab-
lished in Gilmore v. Commissioner,95 the Ninth Circuit in
Crummey concluded that all beneficiaries to the trust had the
legal right to make an unrestricted, present demand of trust
property.9" The Crummey court set forth the "right to enjoy"
and legal right tests as follows:
All exclusions should be allowed under the Perkins test or
the "right to enjoy" test in Gilmore. Under Perkins, all
that is necessary is to find that the demand could not be
resisted. We interpret that to mean legally resisted and,
going on that basis, we do not think the trustee would
90. See discussion infra Part II.D.2-4.
91. See, e.g., Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97
T.C. 74 (1991); Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82
(9th Cir. 1968); Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601
(1956).
92. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th
Cir. 1968).
93. Estate of Cristofai v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 82, 83
(1991).
94. Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601 (1956). The
tax court in Perkins concluded a contribution to a trust will be considered a gift
of a present interest as long as any present demand of trust property by a bene-
ficiary may not be legally resisted. Id. at 606.
95. Gilmore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir.
1954). In Gilmore, the Sixth Circuit indicated that a contribution to a trust will
be considered a gift of a present interest as long as the trust instrument indi-
cates that the beneficiary has the "right to enjoy" all income from the trust. Id.
at 521-22.
96. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th
Cir. 1968). The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that a gift of a present in-
terest should be determined by who was most likely to make a present demand
of trust funds. Id. Although admitting that it would be easier for some benefi-
ciaries to make a demand for the trust funds, the Crummey court concluded
that all beneficiaries could make an unresisted, present demand of trust prop-
erty. Id. As a result, the contributions to the trust were considered to be gifts
of a present interest allowing the donor to take the section 2503(b) annual gift
exclusion. Id.
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have had any choice but to have a guardian appointed to
take the property demanded.
9 7
In allowing the donor to take the section 2503(b) annual gift
exclusion, the Ninth Circuit followed the legal right doctrine,
reasoning that it would be arbitrary and unfair for the
Internal Revenue Service to subjectively decide which donees
were likely to make a present demand of trust property.98
In Cristofani, the tax court also adhered to the legal
right doctrine developed in Perkins and Gilmore and used by
the Ninth Circuit in Crummey."9 The tax court concluded
that both the language of the trust instrument and the
stipulations of the parties dictated that each beneficiary to
the trust "possessed the legal right to withdraw trust corpus
and that the trustees would be unable to legally resist a
[grandchild's] withdrawal demand.""' As in Crummey, the
donor in Gilmore was able to take the section 2503(b) annual
exclusion for each of the named beneficiaries of the trust.'
The intended beneficiaries in Gilmore, as in the Cristo-
fani case, were all of minority status ranging from age one to
age seven.0 2 The trust instrument in Gilmore provided that
the trustee shall pay the income from the trust to the grand-
children as named beneficiaries of the trust.' 3 Furthermore,
the trust instrument also indicated that if any of the grand-
children were to die, the trust would terminate, and the re-
maining trust property would be paid to the estate of the
beneficiaries."°4 Rejecting an assertion by the tax court that
the beneficiaries' right to the income was contingent on the
trustee's willingness to invest the corpus of the trust, the
97. Id. at 88.
98. Id. at 87-88.
99. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74, 83
(1991).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 84-85.
102. Gilmore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 213 F.2d 521 (6th Cir.
1954). In Gilmore, the donor made gifts of corporate stock through the creation
of trusts for her seven grandchildren. Id. at 520.
103. Id. at 520. The trust instrument in Gilmore specifically provided that:
Trustee shall pay the principal and all income from the trust estate to
[the named beneficiary] upon demand by the said [beneficiary], and in
case of his death this trust will terminate and all of the remaining
principal and accumulated income therefrom shall be paid to the estate
of the said [beneficiary].
Id. at 520-21.
104. Id.
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Sixth Circuit determined that each trust instrument gave
every named beneficiary an absolute "right to enjoy" all in-
come from the trust.105 As a result, the contributions to the
trust were deemed to be gifts of a present interest and the
donor was allowed to take the section 2503(b) annual exclu-
sion.1°
Nearly identical to the facts in Gilmore, the Perkins case
involved a gift of corporate stock for the benefit of the donor's
seven minor grandchildren. 7 The donor had created the
trusts for the purpose of providing educational funds for his
grandchildren."8 However, the trustees were given the un-
fettered ability to distribute income from the trust at their
discretion.'9
Similar to the courts' determinations in Cristofani and
Gilmore, the Perkins court concluded that at the time contri-
butions were made to the trust, each of the seven beneficiar-
ies were not sufficiently mature to make a reasoned, effective
demand for the distribution of income from the trusts, or to
move to terminate the trusts."0 In holding that a gift of a
present interest has been made as long as the intended bene-
ficiary cannot be legally resisted from making a present de-
mand for the trust property,"' the court focused on the lan-
105. Id. at 521-22. The tax court argued that a provision in the trust granted
the trustees general investment powers. Gilmore v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 213 F.2d 521, 521-22 (6th Cir. 1954). Because the trustees could use
their discretion as to which investments would be in the best interests of the
beneficiaries, the tax court asserted that the beneficiaries' right to income was
contingent on the willingness of the trustees to invest the corpus of the trust in
such a manner that income would result from the investment. Id. at 522.
Thus, according to the tax court, the beneficiaries' right to enjoy the trust prop-
erty was contingent on the trustees investment discretion, which could not be
classified as a present right to enjoy the trust property. Id.
106. Id. at 521-22.
107. Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601, 602 (1956).
A separate irrevocable trust was created for each of the donor's seven grand-
children. Id. The trust agreements were identical, except for the names of the
beneficiaries and trustees. Id.
108. Id. at 603.
109. Id. at 603. This is similar to the situation in Kieckhefer v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951). See discussion infra
Part II.D.3. However, Perkins may be distinguished from Kieckhefer in that
each trust in Perkins was to continue only until the beneficiary reached the age
of twenty-five. Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601, 603
(1956). When each beneficiary reached the age of twenty-five, the trust was to
terminate and all of the principal was to be paid over to the beneficiary. Id.
110. Id. at 604.
111. Id. at 606.
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guage of the trust instrument. 112 The trust instrument indi-
cated that the beneficiary may demand all of the principal
and income from the trust at any time."'
3. Concerns with the Application of the Current
Standard
Five years prior to Perkins, a Seventh Circuit decision,
Kieckhefer v. Commissioner,"4 illustrated a potential concern
with the "right to enjoy" or legal right standard."' In Kieck-
hefer, the donor grandparent created a trust for the benefit of
his minor grandson in which the donor's son was named trus-
tee. 11 The trust instrument, as in Perkins, provided that dis-
tributions on behalf of the beneficiary's education, comfort,
and support were at the discretion of the trustee."7 Article
Thirteen of the trust specifically provided that the benefici-
ary may demand, either through his individual capacity or
through a legally appointed guardian, all or any part of the
trust property."' Although the trustee was given the power
112. Id. at 605-06.
113. Id. at 604. Each trust instrument provided "that notwithstanding all
other provisions, the beneficiary, his duly appointed guardian, or his parent
may at any time demand and receive all of the income and principal." Id. at
604.
114. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir.
1951).
115. Id. at 122.
116. Id. at 119. The trustee, as the father of the beneficiary, was financially
capable of supporting and educating his son (beneficiary) without the assistance
of trust funds. Id.
117. "Article Fifth" of the trust instrument provided: "The trustee shall pay
to the beneficiary or apply on his behalf such income from the trust and so
much of the principal thereof as may be necessary for the education, comfort,
and support of the beneficiary and shall accumulate for such beneficiary all in-
come not so needed." Id. at 119.
118. "Article Thirteenth" stated:
This trust has been created by the donor after full consideration and
advice. Upon such consideration and advice the donor has determined
that this said trust shall not contain any right in the donor to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate it. The beneficiary shall be entitled to all
or any part of the trust estate or to terminate the trust estate in whole
or in part at any time whenever said John Irving Kieckhefer or the le-
gally appointed guardian for his estate shall make due demand there-
fore by instrument in writing filed with the then trustee and upon such
demand being received by the trustee the trustee shall pay said trust
estate and its accumulations, or the part thereof for which demand is
made, over to said John Irving Kieckhefer or to the legally appointed
guardian for his estate who made such demand on his behalf.
Id. at 119-20.
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to distribute trust property at his discretion, the Seventh
Circuit held that the contribution to the trust was a gift of a
present interest because the beneficiary had the uncondi-
tional right to presently use, possess, or enjoy the trust prop-
erty.119
The Kieckhefer court asserted that, in addition to the
beneficiary having a legal vested right to make a demand of
trust property, the beneficiary must also have the present
ability to enjoy or possess the trust property if a contribution
to a trust is to be considered a gift of a present interest.
120
Because Kieckhefer dealt with the legal right of minor benefi-
ciaries to demand trust property, the court focused its discus-
sion of the general right of minors to make a present demand
of trust property.'' While mandating that the beneficiary
have the present ability to enjoy or possess the trust prop-
erty, in addition to meeting the "vested, legal right" require-
ment, the Seventh Circuit differentiated between restrictions
or contingencies that might dispossess a minor beneficiary of
the present ability to enjoy or possess trust property. 22 The
Kieckhefer court stressed that restrictions and/or contingen-
cies that are imposed by the donor must be distinguished
from restrictions and/or contingencies which are always asso-
ciated with minor beneficiaries.'
It may be concluded from the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in Kieckhefer that, in addition to the beneficiary having a le-
gal, vested right in the trust property, the beneficiary must
also have the present ability to enjoy the trust property for
the taxpayer to benefit from section 2503(b)." If the donor or
trust instrument places a restriction on the beneficiary's
ability to presently enjoy trust property, then any contribu-
tion to the trust will be considered a gift of a future interest
and the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion may not be
used. '5 Conversely, a natural restriction or contingency 6 on
119. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118, 122 (7th
Cir. 1951).
120. Id. at 121-22.
121. Id. at 119. Kieckhefer involved a $3,000 trust contribution by a donor
grandparent to a trust for the benefit of his minor grandchild. Id.
122. Id. at 122.
123. Id. at 121-22.
124. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118, 122 (7th
Cir. 1951).
125. Id.
126. Id. A natural contingency may include the inability of a minor benefici-
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the beneficiary's ability to presently enjoy trust property will
not serve to recharacterize what would normally be consid-
ered a gift of a present interest into a gift of a future inter-
est."7 In this circumstance, the donor may take advantage of
the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion via the Crummey
power.
4. An Alternative Standard for Determining Whether a
Contribution to a Trust May Be Considered a Gift of a
Present Interest
Not all courts have followed the legal right or "right to
enjoy" test.'28 Instead, some courts have focused on the
summation of several different factors to determine if a con-
tribution to a trust is a gift of a present interest rather than
making the determination based solely on whether the bene-
ficiary has a legal right to make a present demand of trust
property."9 The Second Circuit decision in Stifel v. Commis-
sioner' illustrates one court's analysis of various factors to
determine whether a gift of a present interest has been
made.'
Stifel involved a donor who had set up three separate ir-
revocable trusts for his beneficiary children.'2 Each of these
three trusts provided that the trustee had discretion with re-
gard to the distribution of trust funds for the benefit of the
beneficiaries.' Furthermore, the trust instrument indicated
that the trust may be terminated at any time by a benefici-
ary, or her legally appointed guardian, if the beneficiary is
ary to demand trust property because of his or her age. Id. The law mandates
that a minor may not exercise specific rights without the appointment of a legal
guardian. Id.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Stifel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 197 F.2d 107, 110-
11 (2d Cir. 1952).
129. Id. at 110-11.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 108.
133. Id. "Article Second" of the trust instrument stated:
Trustee may at any time apply to the use of the Settlors said daughter
so much of the principal of the trust, and at such time or times, as the
Trustee, in its discretion, may deem necessary or advisable to provide
for her proper education, medical care, living expenses and financial
obligations, after giving full consideration to her age, health, abilities
or limitations, other financial resources, and economic and social sta-
tion in life.
Stifel, 197 F.2d at 108.
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still of minority."'
In concluding that the beneficiaries had received a gift of
a future interest, the Second Circuit looked at several factors,
such as the age of the beneficiary, whether a guardian had
been appointed, and what the donor's purpose had been in
creating the trust.3 ' The Stifel court determined that be-
cause the beneficiaries were minors, they could only make an
effective demand on the trust property through a legal
guardian.'36 At the time of trial, no guardian for the benefici-
aries had ever been appointed.'37 Furthermore, the donor in-
dicated that he had set up the trust with the express purpose
of teaching the beneficiaries how to invest their money.3 ' As
a result, the Second Circuit concluded that the contributions
to the trust were gifts of a future interest and, consequently,
disallowed the use of the section 2503(b) annual gift exclu-
sion.'39
E. The Internal Revenue Service's Current Treatment of the
Use of the Section 2503(b) Annual Gift Exclusion
1. Substance over Form
Following the unanimous Cristofani decision in 1991, the
Service announced that it would deny the exclusions via
Crummey power in circumstances where the substance of the
transfer indicates only an intention to gain the benefit of the
134. Stifel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 197 F.2d 107, 109 (2d Cir.
1952). "Article Eleventh" of the trust instrument stated:
The Settlor's daughter... shall have the right (which may be exercised
during her minority by her general guardian, if any, or by any special
guardian appointed for such purpose by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, but in no event by the Settlor) at any time to terminate this trust
either in whole or in part, and during minority to demand payment of
all or any part of any unexpended income, in which event such part or
all of the principal of the trust, or any accumulated income of the trust,
as to which the trust is so terminated, or such part or all of the income
so demanded, as the case may be shall be paid over to the Settlor's said
daughter, or, if she be a minor, to her general guardian or to such spe-
cial guardian, but in no event to the Settlor.
Id.
135. Id. at 110-11.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 110.
138. Id.
139. Stifel, 197 F.2d at 110-11.
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section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion.14 ° Specifically, if the
fact situation indicates that the substance of the transfers is
merely to obtain annual exclusions and no bona fide gift of a
present interest is intended, the Service stated through AOD
1996-010 that it would deny any Crummey exclusions, re-
gardless of the power holder's other interests in the trust.141
The Service's recent challenge of the use of the Crummey
power may occur only in selective circumstances. 4 2  In re-
sponse to several egregious trust arrangements which sought
the use of the Crummey power, the Service published Techni-
cal Advisory Memorandum ("TAM") 9628004.143 TAM
9628004 described the circumstances under which the
Crummey power would be challenged.'" This advisory
memorandum announced:
[W]here nominal beneficiaries enjoy only discretionary in-
come interests, remote contingent rights to the remainder,
or no rights whatsoever in the income or remainder, their
non exercise [of withdrawal rights] indicates that there
was some kind of prearranged understanding with the do-
nor that these rights were not meant to be exercised or
that their exercise would result in undesirable conse-
quences or both. [Based on the specific facts of the trust
arrangement,] we conclude that as part of a prearranged
understanding, all of the beneficiaries knew that their
rights were paper rights only, or that exercising them
would result in unfavorable consequences. There is no
other logical reason why these individuals would choose
not to withdraw $10,000 a year as a gift which would not
be includable in their income or subject the Donor to gift
140. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74
(1991), acq. in result 1992-1 C.B. 1.
141. Id.
142. Jefferey Pennell, It's Open Hunting Season for Crummey Withdrawal
Rights, Again, 17 WEALTH TRANSFER TAX DEV. 1, 19-21 (1996).
143. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9628004 (July 12, 1996).
144. Pennell, supra note 142, at 20. The trust arrangements which caused
the government to issue TAM 9628004 were much more extreme than the fact
situation in either Cristofani or Crummey. Id. In these trust arrangements,
the power holders were remote descendants or spouses of remote descendants.
Id. There was no requirement that the trustee give notice to the beneficiaries
of their Crummey withdrawal rights or that the trustee give notice that any ad-
ditions may have been made to the trust. Id. Furthermore, contributions were
often made so late in the year that it would have been nearly impossible for the
beneficiaries to make a withdrawal, even assuming they had been aware of
their ability to do so and that there had been a contribution to the trust. Id.
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tax.145
TAM 9628004 also explained the circumstances under
which a beneficiary will be considered to have had the lawful
right to withdraw corpus or income from a trust.'4 6 Through
the memorandum, the government stated:
The [Internal Revenue] Service does not contest annual
gift tax exclusions for Crummey powers held by current
income beneficiaries and persons with vested remainder
interests. These individuals have current or long term
economic interests in the trust and in the value of the cor-
pus. It is understandable that in weighing these interests,
they decide not to exercise their withdrawal rights.
147
Based on the language of TAM 9628004, the Internal
Revenue Service has indicated that it will challenge the use
of the Crummey power only when the substance of the trans-
fer clearly indicates that the donor's purpose in making the
gift is to obtain the section 2503(b) annual exclusion and not
to benefit the recipient. 148 By expressly stating the circum-
stances under which it will deny the use of the Crummey
power, the government is indicating that its "substance over
form" approach will only apply when the [demand rights]
beneficiaries have no interest in the trust or remote contin-
gent interests in the remainder."9 Assuming that the gov-
ernment will disallow the use of the Crummey power in these
limited circumstances, trust arrangements similar to those
found in Cristofani and Crummey may still lawfully use the
Crummey power.5 ° As a result, it appears that the govern-
ment will challenge the use of the Crummey power only when
it appears that the taxpayer's primary purpose for contrib-
uting to the trust is to gain the benefit of the section 2503(b)
annual gift exclusion rather than to grant the beneficiary the
present ability to enjoy the trust property. 5'
2. Summary
The Internal Revenue Service's attack on the use of the
Crummey power in conjunction with section 2503(b) is based
145. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9628004 (July 12, 1996).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Pennell, supra note 142, at 20.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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on the assertion that the substance rather than the form of
section 2503(b) should govern the availability of the annual
gift exclusion. 5 ' Invoking the "substance over form" ap-
proach,"3 the Internal Revenue Service has specifically at-
tacked claimed exclusions via the Crummey power held by
contingent remainder beneficiaries.' The Service has con-
ceded that it will not contest annual gift tax exclusions for
the Crummey power held by current income beneficiaries and
persons with vested remainder interests.' Conversely, the
Service has indicated that future annual gift exclusions via
the Crummey power will be subject to much stricter scru-
tiny.
56
The decision by the Internal Revenue Service to chal-
lenge the use of the Crummey power is limited only to specific
trust arrangements." 7 Consequently, the Service has taken a
strict position regarding the use of the Crummey power by
indicating that it will challenge the use of the Crummey
power in situations where beneficiaries enjoy discretionary
income interests, remote rights to the remainder, or no rights
to the remainder at all. 58 Through TAM 9628004, the Serv-
ice has stated that when a beneficiary enjoys only a limited
interest in the trust property, there must be a prearranged
understanding between the donor and the beneficiary that
any of the limited rights a beneficiary has are not to be exer-
cised. "'59 As a result, use of the section 2503(b) annual exclu-
sion may be denied when a beneficiary has a limited interest
in the trust property. 160
The publication of TAM 962800 has rendered future use
of the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion via the Crummey
power uncertain.16 ' Although the Service has indicated that
it will challenge the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion in
specific trust arrangements, the Service has also stated that
it will not challenge the use of the section 2503(b) annual ex-
152. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
153. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
154. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9628004 (July 12, 1996).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
158. Tech. Adv. Mem. 9628004 (July 12, 1996).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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clusion via the Crummey power as long as the power holder is
a current income beneficiary or an individual with a vested
remainder interest.'62 Rather, the Service has indicated that
it will challenge only those cases where the beneficiary has
either a very remote contingent remainder or no interest at
all in the corpus or income of the trust.'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The problem created by the leveraged use of the section
2503(b) annual exclusion via the Crummey power is that even
if taxpayers adhere to the language of the Internal Revenue
Code and precedent interpreting it, the Internal Revenue
Service still threatens that their use of the section 2503(b)
annual exclusion may be denied under some circumstances.
The underlying concern of the Internal Revenue Service is
that through the Crummey and Cristofani interpretations of
section 2503(b), a donor taxpayer has the ability to increase
his or her federal gift tax exclusions in proportion to the
number of beneficiaries named in the trust instrument.
Consider the following hypothetical: Donor A has cre-
ated an irrevocable living trust in which she wants to con-
tribute $80,000 annually. Although Donor A's primary inten-
tion in creating the trust is to benefit her three children, she
will only be able to exclude $30,000 from federal gift tax un-
der section 2503(b).' Assuming Donor A has five or more
grandchildren, she could name five of her grandchildren as
contingent remainders and exclude the entire $80,000 contri-
bution to the trust from gift tax under the Crummey and
Cristofani decisions as long as the contributions are consid-
ered gifts of a present interest.
65
Individuals proposing to create irrevocable living trusts
will likely seek advice as to the Internal Revenue Service's
current treatment of section 2503(b) and which requirements
must be met in order to take full advantage of the section
2503(b) annual gift exclusion. Although it appears that the
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1997). Under section 2503(b), Donor A would have the
ability to exclude $10,000 from federal gift tax for each named beneficiary. Id.
As a result, Donor A would be able to exclude a total of $30,000 from federal gift
tax because she has named three beneficiaries. Id.
165. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
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Service is currently allowing donors to take the section
2503(b) annual exclusion as long as the contribution is con-
sidered a gift of a present interest, the Service has expressly
indicated that it intends to limit the liberal treatment of the
taxpayer use of the section 2503(b) annual exclusion via the
Crummey power."
Donor taxpayers should be confident that use of the sec-
tion 2503(b) annual exclusion will be allowed under the cur-
rent standard set forth in Crummey and Cristofani when
planning their estates. Current treatment of the section
2503(b) annual exclusion should be adhered to by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service since many taxpayers have already
planned their estates in accordance with the Crummey and
Cristofani decisions."' Furthermore, because of the motiva-
tion of most taxpayers in creating a trust, it is unlikely that
section 2503(b) will be subject to abuse. 68 As a result, the
donor taxpayer seeking the section 2503(b) annual gift exclu-
sion should be left only with the duty of ensuring that any
contribution to a trust be deemed a gift of a present interest,
irrespective of whether there is an agreement between the
donor and the beneficiary regarding the beneficiary's ability
to make a present demand of trust property.9
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Is the Knowledge and Capability of the Beneficiary to
Withdraw Trust Property Necessary to Use the Section
2503(b) Annual Gift Exclusion?
This section first analyzes whether a donor's ability to
use the Crummey power to exclude contributions to a trust is
dependent upon whether the beneficiaries are aware that
they have the ability to make a present demand of trust
property.7 ° Precedent concerning the use of the section
2503(b) annual exclusion implies that the Internal Revenue
Service does not require that the beneficiary be informed of
166. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
167. See discussion infra Part IV.C.1.
168. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
169. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B.
170. See e.g., Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97
T.C. 74 (1991); Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82
(9th Cir. 1968).
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his or her ability to make a present demand of trust prop-
erty.'71 An examination of the Service's most recent treat-
ment of the use of section 2503(b) reveals that a donor may
still take the section 2503(b) annual exclusion even when the
beneficiary is not aware that she has a right to demand trust
property.' Consequently, a donor has no legal obligation to
expressly inform or make known to a beneficiary of his or her
right to make a present demand of contributed trust funds
when using the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion via the
Crummey power.
In Crummey, the court speculated that there was a prob-
ability "that some, if not all, of the beneficiaries did not know
that they had the [present ability] to demand funds from the
trust."'73 The court further reasoned that it was likely that
the beneficiaries did not know when contributions had been
made to the trust nor in what amounts the contributions had
been made.'7' The Crummey court then concluded that even
if the beneficiaries had known that contributions were being
made to the trust, most of the contributions were made so
late in the year that the time allotted to the beneficiaries to
make a demand of the trust funds was severely limited.'75 If
the beneficiary did not exercise his right to make a present
demand of trust property by December 31st of the year in
which the transfer was made, the beneficiary could no longer
exercise his right to the lesser amount of the transfer made
in that year, or $4,000.17 Consistent with the court's assess-
ment that the beneficiaries were likely unaware of their
ability to make a present demand of trust property, none of
171. See e.g., Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97
T.C. 74 (1991); Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82
(9th Cir. 1968); Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601
(1956).
172. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 83.
173. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 88. The key provision of the trust agreement in Crummey stated:
With respect to such additions, each child of the trustors may demand
at any time (up to and including December 31 of the year in which a
transfer to his or her Trust has been made) the sum of Four Thousand
Dollars ($4,000.00) or the amount of the transfer from each donor,
whichever is less, payable in cash immediately upon receipt by the
Trustee of the demand in writing and in any event, not later than De-
cember 31 in the year in which such transfer was made.
Id. at 83.
176. Id. at 83-85.
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the four beneficiaries had ever made a demand under the
provision, nor had any distributions been made at the time of
the Ninth Circuit's decision.'77 Thus, it is evident from the
Crummey decision that the presence of an express agreement
between the donor and the beneficiary regarding the benefi-
ciary's ability to make a present demand of trust funds need
not exist for the donor to utilize the section 2503(b) annual
gift exclusion. 7 '
Cristofani lends further support to the notion that there
does not have to be an express understanding between the
donor and the beneficiary regarding the beneficiary's ability
or inability to make a present demand of trust property.7 " In
Cristofani, there was no agreement or understanding be-
tween the donor and beneficiaries that the beneficiaries
would not exercise their withdrawal rights following a contri-
bution to the trust by the donor. 8° As in Crummey, none of
the beneficiaries in Cristofani exercised their right to with-
draw trust funds, nor were any funds distributed to the bene-
ficiaries under the trust agreement.' It may be implied from
the holding of Cristofani that the presence of an express
agreement between the donor and the beneficiary regarding
the ability of the beneficiary to make a present demand of
trust funds is not necessary for the donor to take the section
2503(b) annual gift exclusion for contributions made to the
trust.
18 2
Based on the identical holdings and similar trust ar-
rangements found in Crummey and Cristofani, it is evident
that the existence of an express agreement between the do-
177. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88.
178. Id. at 88. The Crummey court concluded that the petitioners should be
allowed all of the section 2503(b) exclusions claimed during the two year period
in question. Id.
179. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74,
77, 83 (1991).
180. Id.
181. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 76-77. The beneficiaries in Cristofani were the
donor's five grandchildren who had contingent remainder interests in the trust.
Id. at 75-76. Although none of the Beneficiaries exercised their right to with-
draw funds from the trust, "Article Twelfth" of the Trust required that the trus-
tee notify the beneficiaries of the trust each time a contribution to the trust was
received. Id. at 76.
182. Id. at 83-84. The Cristofani court allowed the petitioner to take the sec-
tion 2503(b) annual exclusion with respect to each of Donor's grandchildren for
each one-third interest in the "Spring Street property" transferred to the trust.
Id. at 84-85.
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nor and the beneficiary regarding the beneficiary's ability or
knowledge of the ability to make a present demand of trust
property is not a prerequisite for a donor to take advantage of
the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion via the Crummey
power.'83 In both Cristofani and Crummey, the court allowed
the donor taxpayer to employ the section 2503(b) annual ex-
clusion for each transfer of property made to the trust, even
though neither trust arrangement contained language indi-
cating an agreement between the donor, the trustee, or the
beneficiaries that the beneficiaries would or would not exer-
cise their right to make a present demand of trust property.
8
'
The decisions in Crummey and Cristofani permit a donor
taxpayer to take the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion
without an express agreement between the donor and the
beneficiary regarding the beneficiary's ability or inability to
make a present demand for the trust property.'85 Further-
more, a donor may take the section 2503(b) annual gift exclu-
sion even when the beneficiary does not know that he or she
has the present ability to demand funds from the trust.
86
B. What Is the Best Standard to Define a Contribution of a
'Present Interest?"
1. The Prominent Standard: The 'Right to Enjoy"
Standard
Another factor that should be considered in determining
whether a donor may use the section 2503(b) annual gift ex-
clusion via the Crummey power is whether or not a trust con-
tribution constitutes a gift of a "present interest."'87 Prece-
dent indicates that a determination by the Internal Revenue
Service of whether a gift of a "present interest" has been
made is based on whether the beneficiary has a legal right or
183. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74,
75-84 (1991); Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 83-
87 (9th Cir. 1968).
184. See Estate of Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 75-84; Crummey, 397 F.2d at 83-87.
185. See Estate of Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 83-84; Crummey, 397 F.2d at 85-88.
186. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 87-88.
187. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3. Although section 25.2503-3 of the Treasury
Regulations, found in the Internal Revenue Code, defines what a future interest
is (which implies what a gift of a present interest is not), precedent has estab-
lished that different tests exist to determine what is a gift of a present interest.
Id.
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"right to enjoy" the property of the trust rather than the mere
probability that the beneficiary will actually demand trust
property.
1 8 8
In Cristofani, the United States Tax Court reiterated the
standard set forth in Perkins, Gilmore, and Crummey to de-
termine whether a gift of a present interest has been made to
a beneficiary.'89 In determining whether a gift of a present
interest had been made,' the Cristofani court strictly ad-
hered to the "right to enjoy" standard set forth in Crummey. 91
As in Crummey, the Cristofani court relied on precedent
to determine whether a gift of a present interest had been
made.'92 Case law relied upon by the tax court in Cristofani
to determine whether the donor would be allowed to take the
section 2503(b) annual exclusion included Perkins, Gilmore,
and Kieckhefer,9 all of which focused mainly on whether the
beneficiary has a legal, unrestricted right to trust property.'94
The benefit of the "right to enjoy" test is that it provides
a clear guideline for determining whether a gift of a present
interest has been made. Unlike the "summation of the fac-
tors" test,98 the "right to enjoy" test mandates only that the
intended beneficiary have the present ability to make an im-
mediate demand of trust property.'96 Thus, whether a gift of
a present interest has been made may be ascertained solely
188. Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th
Cir. 1968). Although the current test for present interest used by both the
Cristofani and Crummey courts is whether the beneficiary had the present
"right to enjoy" trust property, the Internal Revenue Service and the tax court
have both hinted that other considerations may be used to determine whether a
gift of a present interest has been given, such as the language of the trust
agreement, when enjoyment begins, whether the beneficiary may be legally re-
stricted in a demand for trust property, the age of the beneficiary and, if the
beneficiary is a minor, whether a guardian has been appointed. Id. at 83-87.
189. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74, 80
(1991). (citing Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601 (1956);
Gilmore v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954); and
Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88).
190. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 83-84. In Cristofani, the question was whether
the donor's $70,000 contribution of property to the trust in 1984 and 1985 con-
stituted a gift of a present interest to her five grandchildren who each had a
contingent remainder interest in the trust property. Id.
191. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
192. Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 80-81.
193. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir.
1951).
194. Id. at 122.
195. See discussion supra Part II.D.4.
196. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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from the language of the trust instrument.19 7 Compared to
the "summation of the factors" test,'98 the "right to enjoy" test
provides a clear and identifiable means for which to deter-
mine whether a trust contribution may be considered a gift of
a present interest.199
a. The Significance of the Beneficiary's "Right to
Enjoy" in Comparison to Other Factors
With regard to trust arrangements which give the bene-
ficiary the unqualified right to demand trust property, it may
be concluded that under no circumstances may a trustee
withhold payment of trust property. 00 The Kieckhefer deci-
sion illustrates the weight allotted to the beneficiary's abso-
lute right to make a present demand of trust property and to
presently use, possess, or enjoy trust property even when a
trust instrument grants the trustee unfettered discretion
over the distribution of trust income. 201
In Kieckhefer, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that "it is
not, however, the use, possession, or enjoyment by the benefi-
ciary which marks the dividing line between a present and
future interest, but it is the right conferred upon the benefi-
ciary to such use, possession, or enjoyment."0 2 The court's
reasoning signifies the importance the court will place on a
beneficiary's legal ability to make a present demand of trust
property and to presently use or possess such property.0 ' It
is likely that the Internal Revenue Service will allow the use
197. If the trust instrument expressly states that a beneficiary has the unre-
stricted, legal right to make a present demand of trust funds, a gift of a present
interest will be deemed to have been made. See e.g., Estate of Cristofani v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74 (1991); Crummey v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968); Gilmore v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954).
198. See discussion supra Part II.D.4.
199. The "summation of the factors" test requires that the court take into
account many different factors and make subjective conclusions regarding the
donor's intent in determining whether a gift of a present interest has been
made. See discussion supra Part II.D.4.
200. Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118, 120 (7th
Cir. 1951). If the trust instrument gives the beneficiary the absolute right to
make an immediate demand of trust property, the trustee, even if granted un-
fettered discretion over the distribution of the trust funds, may not refuse to
grant the beneficiary's demand of trust funds. Id.
201. Id. at 118.
202. Id. at 121.
203. Id.
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of the section 2503(b) annual exclusion via the Crummey
power in trust arrangements where the trust instrument
specifically indicates that the beneficiary has a vested right
to the trust property and the present ability to use, possess,
or enjoy such property.2
b. An Alternative Method of Determining Whether a
Gift of a Present Interest Has Been Made
Similar to the Gilmore "right to enjoy" test, the Perkins
decision established that a donor will have made a gift of a
present interest so long as that donor cannot legally resist a
beneficiary's demand of trust property."5 Implicit in Perkins
is the assumption that the language of the trust instrument
is critical in the court's determination of whether a donor
may employ the section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion. °8
As shown by the facts presented in Crummey, a child
could inform the trustee that she is demanding trust prop-
erty as long as the demand is pursuant to language in the
trust instrument.0 7 In such a case, the trustee would petition
the court for the appointment of a legal guardian (likely the
parent of the beneficiary) and turn the funds over to the
guardian.2 8 The Crummey court also indicated that it may be
possible for a parent of a beneficiary to make a demand of the
trust funds as a legal guardian pursuant to language con-
tained in the trust instrument.2 9 Similarly, in Cristofani, the
trust instrument expressly indicated that both the primary
beneficiaries, as well as those beneficiaries named in the
trust with contingent remainder interests, had the ability to
make a present demand from the trust.210
204. Fondren v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U.S. 18, 20 (5th Cir.
1944). The Fifth Circuit decision in Fondren illustrates the position taken by
the I.R.S. that use of the 2503(b) annual gift exclusion will be dictated by when
the beneficiary can enjoy the property, not when the beneficiary's legal right to
the property has vested. Id. The Fondren court implied that if a trust instru-
ment causes there to be a substantial period of time between the will of the
beneficiary to enjoy the property and the beneficiary's actual enjoyment of the
trust property, the trust contribution will likely be considered a gift of a future
interest. Id. at 20, 21.
205. Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601, 606 (1956).
206. Id. at 604-06.
207. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
208. Crummey, 397 F.2d at 87.
209. Id. at 87.
210. Id. at 76. Under "Article Twelfth," each of the five grandchildren with
contingent remainder interests were granted the express right to withdraw an
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c. Summary of the "Right to Enjoy" and Legal Right
Tests
The trust instruments in Cristofani, Crummey, and
Perkins each contained language which expressly gave the
beneficiary the right to make a present demand of trust
property.21' In all three cases, the court determined that con-
tributions made to each respective trust were gifts of a pres-
ent interest, allowing the donor to take the section 2503(b)
annual gift exclusion for all beneficiaries named in each
trust.
212
It is evident from the similar conclusions reached by the
courts in Perkins, Crummey, and Cristofani that language
contained in a trust instrument expressly granting a benefi-
ciary or the beneficiary's legal guardian the right to make a
present demand of trust property is a significant factor in de-
termining whether a contribution may be deemed a gift of a
present interest.213  While each trust arrangement is differ-
ent, precedent dictates that if the trust instrument grants
the beneficiary the immediate "right to enjoy" trust property,
it is likely that any contribution to the trust will be deemed a
gift of a present interest.21 Often, the donor has created and
contributed to the trust with the goal of avoiding federal es-
tate tax liability.215 However, even when the motive of the
donor is to avoid tax liability, current treatment by the In-
ternal Revenue Service of taxpayer use of the Crummey
power mandates that as long as the beneficiary has the pres-
ent "right to enjoy" trust property, any contribution to a trust
will be considered a gift of a present interest.1 ' Subse-
quently, a donor expressly indicating through a trust instru-
ment that a beneficiary has a vested right to the property of
amount not to exceed the amount specified for the gift tax exclusion under sec-
tion 2503(b) ($10,000) as long as the demand for trust funds was made fifteen
days following a contribution to the trust. Id.
211. See Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C.
74, 75-77 (1991); Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82,
83-87; Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601, 602-604
(1956).
212. See Estate of Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 84-85; Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88;
Perkins, 27 T.C. at 606.
213. See Estate of Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 84; Crummey, 397 F.2d at 88;
Perkins, 27 T.C. at 604-06.
214. See, e.g., Perkins, 27 T.C. at 601; Crummey, 397 F.2d at 82; Estate of
Cristofani, 97 T.C. at 74.
215. Perkins, 27 T.C. at 605-06.
216. Id.
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the trust, as well as the right of immediate enjoyment, will
likely be allowed to utilize the section 2503(b) annual gift ex-
clusion via the Crummey power.
2. A Second Test: "Summation of the Factors"
A second test employed by the courts to determine
whether a trust contribution is considered a gift of a present
interest is the "summation of the factors" test.217 However,
an examination of current precedent involving the section
2503(b) annual gift exclusion reveals that rarely, if at all, is
the "summation of the factors" test still utilized by the courts
in determining whether a gift of a present interest has been
made.218 Stifel v. Commissioner 9 illustrated some of the fac-
tors which the court will take into consideration when em-
ploying the "summation of the factors" test.20 In determining
whether a contribution to a trust will be considered a gift of a
present interest, the Stifel court looked to the language of the
trust instrument, including whether a minor beneficiary
could make a demand in her own individual capacity,
whether a guardian had been appointed, and what the cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of the trust were.22'
Although similar to the trust arrangements found in
Perkins, Gilmore, Crummey, and Cristofani, the court in
Stifel denied the donor the use of the Section 1003 annual
gift exclusion,2 concluding that contributions to the trust
221were gifts of future rather than present interests. In de-
ciding whether there was a substantial likelihood that the
beneficiaries would actually enjoy the trust property, the
court reasoned that the beneficiaries could not make a de-
mand of trust property in their individual capacities, but,
rather, only through a guardian224 and that the primary pur-
217. See discussion supra Part II.D.4.
218. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74,
80-81 (1991). Echoing the Ninth Circuit in Crummey, the Cristofani court re-
jected a test to determine present interest based on factors, such as, the trust
instrument, the law as to minors, and the circumstances surrounding the for-
mation of the trust. Id.
219. 197 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1952).
220. Id. at 110.
221. See discussion supra Part II.D.4.
222. Section 1003 is the 1952 equivalent of the current section 2503(b) an-
nual gift exclusion. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1997).
223. Stifel, 197 F.2d at 111.
224. See discussion supra Part II.D.4.
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pose behind the creation of the trust was to help the benefici-
aries learn how to invest their money and not to aid in their
support."5 Considering the language of the trust instrument,
the age of the beneficiaries, and, most importantly, the cir-
cumstances surrounding the creation of the trust, the Stifel
court concluded that the contributions to the trust were gifts
of a future interest.
226
3. Integrating the "Right to Enjoy" and "Substantial
Likelihood" Tests
The factual basis of Stifel is similar to many of the cases
previously discussed under the "right to enjoy" test.227 In de-
termining whether a gift of a present interest has been made,
it is crucial that the court not employ a single test. Rather,
an integration of the "right to enjoy" 28 test and the
"summation of the factors"2 19 test will provide the most effec-
tive means for determining whether a gift of a present inter-
est has been made.
A proper integration of the "summation of the factors"
and the "right to enjoy" tests is illustrated through the deci-
sion in Stifel.3 ° In addition to the language of the trust in-
strument and the circumstances surrounding the creation of
the trust, the Stifel court considered the need for the benefi-
ciary to have a legal right to the trust property, as well as the
present right to enjoy or possess such property.' As in
Kieckhefer, the Stifel court adhered to the proposition that no
gift to a minor would be considered tax-free if the minor's le-
gal right to enjoy the gifted property was the only test for
present interest. 2  In construing the above proposition, the
Stifel court concluded that, although the minor beneficiaries
had a legal right to the trust property, they did not have the
ability to presently enjoy or possess any of the trust funds. 3
225. See discussion supra Part II.D.4.
226. Stifel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 197 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir.
1952).
227. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.
228. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.a-b.
229. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
230. Stifel, 197 F.2d at 110.
231. See discussion supra Part 1V.B.I.a.
232. Stifel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 197 F.2d 107, 110 (citing
Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118, 122 (7th Cir.
1951)).
233. Stifel, 197 F.2d at 110-11.
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Because the minors, in their individual capacities, could not
make a present demand of the trust property and no guard-
ian had been appointed to exercise this right for them, there
was no one who could exercise their election rights on their
behalf and the minors were deemed to have acquired only fu-
ture interests in the trust property.""'
Although the "right to enjoy" or legal right test is the bet-
ter single test for determining whether a gift of a present in-
terest has been made, the Stifel decision lends support to the
notion that the donor taxpayer should consider employing
both the "summation of the factors" test and the "right to en-
joy" or legal right test in determining whether a trust contri-
bution will be considered a gift of a present interest. Once a
trust contribution is considered a gift of a present interest,
the donor taxpayer will be allowed to take the section 2503(b)
annual gift exclusion."'6
C. Policy Considerations: Factors Against the Internal
Revenue Service's More Stringent Treatment of Section
2503(b)
1. Taxpayer Reliance on the Current Treatment of
Section 2503(b)
Another factor that supports the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice's current interpretation of the section 2503(b) annual gift
exclusion is the effect which increased scrutiny of the annual
gift exclusion will have on estate planning done in accordance
with the Crummey and Cristofani decisions. Specifically, in-
creased scrutiny by the Service with regard to the use of the
section 2503(b) annual gift exclusion will have the most sig-
nificant impact on those taxpayers who have already planned
their estates in accordance with the Crummey decision."6
Taxpayers who created trust arrangements prior to the
publication of TAM 9628004 did so in accordance with prece-
dent interpreting the extent to which the section 2503(b) an-
nual exclusion could be used. If the Service does not acqui-
esce in its "substance over form" approach limiting the use of
the section 2503(b) annual exclusion,3 those taxpayers who
234. Id.
235. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1997).
236. See discussion supra Part I.
237. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
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have already created trust arrangements in reliance on the
Crummey and Cristofani decisions will be most seriously af-
fected.
The Internal Revenue Service invokes its "substance over
form" approach by asserting that inaction by beneficiaries in
exercising their right to withdraw trust property implies that
there was a prearranged agreement between the donor and
the beneficiaries that the beneficiaries would not exercise
their right to withdraw trust funds.2"' The Service's proposal
will force those taxpayers who have relied on the court's deci-
sions in Crummey and Cristofani to revamp their existing
federal tax scheme."' Because many of the tax schemes of
those taxpayers who have created trusts involve scheduled
contributions to the trust, the effect of the Service's proposal
would be to alter the taxpayer's contributions to the trust or
to halt the contributions altogether. Taxpayers who previ-
ously relied on the section 2503(b) annual exclusion may now
be forced to either terminate the trust or alter their trust
contributions in order to maximize federal tax planning in
accordance the Service's new position regarding the use of
section 2503(b) via the Crummey power.24°
Taxpayers who lawfully created trust arrangements in
accordance with section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
and the decisions in Crummey and Cristofani prior to the
publication of TAM 9628004 face potential problems.2 4' Be-
cause these individuals planned their estate in accordance
with the federal gift tax law at the time the trust was cre-
ated, the Service's retroactive limitation of the use of section
2503(b) would likely negate the benefits of the taxpayers'
current tax scheme. In accordance with TAM 9628004, the
Service could disallow the section 2503(b) annual gift exclu-
sion for a beneficiary who has only a discretionary income or
remote contingent remainder interest in the trust.14' Because
the Service would have previously allowed a section 2503(b)
exclusion for the beneficiary and the donor taxpayer had re-
238. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
239. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
240. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
241. Taxpayers employing section 2503(b) needed only to abide by the deci-
sions in Crummey and Cristofani to lawfully take the annual gift exclusion. See
Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74 (1991);
Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
242. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
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lied on this exclusion, the Service's new proposal would cause
an unwarranted increase in the donor taxpayer's federal gift
tax liability.243
2. Abuse of the Section 2503(b) Annual Gift Exclusion
Through the Crummey Power
A second policy consideration supporting a Crummey in-
terpretation of the annual gift exclusion is the frequency and
degree of taxpayer abuse to which section 2503(b) is currently
subjected.244 Should the Internal Revenue Service continue to
allow the donor to take advantage of the section 2503(b) an-
nual gift exclusion via the Crummey power in trust arrange-
ments where it objectively appears2 45 that the donor intended
a beneficiary to have a present interest in the trust property,
taxpayer abuse of the section 2503(b) annual exclusion will
be unlikely.
However, the possibility that the section 2503(b) annual
exclusion may be subject to abuse when applied through the
Crummey and Cristofani decisions is a major factor in the
Service's "substance over form" attack on the current use of
the section 2503(b) annual exclusion. '46 The proposed chal-
lenge of the use of section 2503(b) is based on a concern by
the Internal Revenue Service that the current use of section
2503(b), as interpreted through Crummey and Cristofani, al-
lows donor taxpayers to name beneficiaries in relation to the
amount annually contributed to the trust. 4' Lawful use of
243. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
244. See discussion supra Part I.
245. Heyen v. United States, 945 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1991). In determining
whether a donor has transferred a taxable gift to the donee, the subjective in-
tent of the donor at the time of the transfer is not an important factor in de-
termining whether the donor has made a gift. Id. at 361. Rather, determina-
tion of whether a taxable gift has been made is based primarily on the objective
facts and circumstances under which the transfer is made. Id.
246. Owen G. Fiore et al., Is the End in Sight for Crummey/Cristofani
Trusts, TAX ADVISOR ALERTMEMORANDUM, Sept. 1996, at 11.
247. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 T.C. 74(1991); Crummey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir.
1968); Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 27 T.C. 601 (1956); Gil-
more v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 213 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1954). Un-
der the standard set forth in Crummey and Cristofani, the major requirement
for taking the section 2503(b) exclusion is that the beneficiary receive a gift of a
present interest. As a result, the donor could theoretically name as many bene-
ficiaries as necessary to have the effect of excluding the entire amount of each
contribution from federal gift tax.
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section 2503(b) only requires that contributions to the trust
by the donor taxpayer be considered gifts of a present inter-
est.
248
Although minimizing federal gift tax liability does pro-
vide motivation for creating trusts,249 another powerful rea-
son for creating trusts is to benefit those beneficiaries named
in the trust instrument. In most circumstances, trusts are
created by a parent or grandparent with the intent of bene-
fiting their children, grandchildren, or both. Using the trust
as a medium, the donor taxpayer can make inter vivos trans-
fers while retaining some degree of control over who is to
benefit from the trust, when distributions are to be made
from the trust, and tax concerns which may arise in connec-
tion with the trust.21' Although the trust agreement may be
altered, the result of naming more beneficiaries to a trust is
to distribute the right to the income and corpus of the trust to
more individuals. Subsequently, each beneficiary will enjoy a
smaller percentage of the trust property. Because the pri-
mary motivation of the donor taxpayer will be to provide spe-
cific beneficiaries with the right to a predetermined amount
of trust property, it is unlikely that the donor will increase
the number of beneficiaries named in a trust instrument
solely to take advantage of section 2503(b) through the
Crummey power. Hence, when considering the primary mo-
tivation of the donor taxpayer in creating the trust, the In-
ternal Revenue Service's concern over the perceived abuse of
section 2503(b) is unfounded.25'
V. PROPOSAL: SUGGESTED LEGISLATION FOR THE SECTION
2503(b) ANNUAL EXCLUSION VIA THE CRUMMEY POWER
The following framework codifies the requirements set
forth in the Crummey and Cristofani decisions interpreting
section 2503(b) as the "Section 2503(b) Annual Exclusion Pa-
rameters." These Parameters will aid courts in determining
whether the section 2503(b) annual exclusion has been law-
fully used in trust arrangements. Furthermore, the below
framework could also provide a guideline for donor taxpayers
who have created a trust and want to ensure that their use of
248. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.
249. See discussion supra Part lY.B.I.c.
250. Fiore & Ramsbacher, supra note 7, at 10.
251. Id.
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the section 2503(b) annual exclusion will not be challenged by
the Internal Revenue Service:
Section 2503(b) Annual Exclusion Parameters.
(A) For purposes of taking the $10,000 annual exclusion
in relation to either present or contingent beneficiaries
pursuant to section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code,
the taxpayer must meet the following requirements:
(1) Each trust contribution must be a gift of a present
interest.
252
(a) A trust contribution will be considered to be a
gift of a present interest only when:
(i) the beneficiary has a legal vested right in
the property of the trust and has the pres-
ent ability to enjoy or possess the property
of the trust upon demand25 or
(ii) the different factors of the trust ar-
rangement indicate that a gift of a present
interest has been made and the beneficiary
has a legal vested right in the property of
the trust and has the present ability to en-
joy or possess the property of the trust upon
demand.25'
(2) The taxpayer's primary purpose for creating the
trust is to benefit a predetermined number of indi-
viduals named in the trust at the time the trust is
created.255
(B) In determining whether section 2503(b) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code may be used, the existence of an ex-
press agreement between the donor and the beneficiary
regarding the beneficiary's right to withdraw trust prop-
erty shall not be controlling.256
252. This idea is taken directly from section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code. This language is placed in the proposed legislation because section
2503(b) mandates that a gift of a present interest be made if the annual exclu-
sion is to be taken. I.R.C § 2503(b) (1997).
253. See, e.g., Kieckhefer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 189 F.2d 118(7th Cir. 1951); see also supra Part 1V.B.l.a. for a discussion of this guideline.
254. See discussion supra Part lV.B.3.
255. This requirement is taken directly from the policy considerations sur-
rounding the use of section 2503(b) via the Crummey power. See discussion su-
pra Part IV.C.2.
256. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The publication of TAM 9628004 illustrates the inability
of the Internal Revenue Service to completely accept the
Crummey and Cristofani interpretations of the section
2503(b) annual exclusion.257 The conflicting treatment of sec-
tion 2503(b) by TAM 9628004 and prior case law obviates the
need for new legislation to guide taxpayers on the use of the
section 2503(b) annual exclusion.25 With trust arrangements
continuing to be created by taxpayers employing the section
2503(b) annual exclusion, determining whether the section
2503(b) annual exclusion has been properly used will become
more problematic for taxpayers who want to rely on this sec-
tion in planning their estates. As a result, legislation must
be developed to solidify all the requirements that must be
met to lawfully use the section 2503(b) annual exclusion."9
This comment combines specific requirements set forth
in prior case law with the policy concerns of the Internal
Revenue Service to establish a framework for determining
lawful use of the section 2503(b) annual exclusion.26  Each
trust arrangement in which the section 2503(b) annual exclu-
sion will be used is apt to differ. Nevertheless, taxpayer ad-
herence to the requirements set forth in this comment can
help ensure that use of the section 2503(b) annual exclusion
will not be contested by the Internal Revenue Service.
Christopher Steenson
257. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
258. Prior to 1996, the Crummey and Cristofani decisions served as a guide-
line for taxpayers taking the section 2503(b) annual exclusion. See discussion
supra Parts II.B-C. However, in 1996, the Internal Revenue Service threatened
to challenge the use of the section 2503(b) annual exclusion via the Crummey
power when beneficiaries with discretionary income or remote contingent inter-
ests in the trust property had not exercised their rights to the trust property.
See discussion supra Part II.E.1. The Internal Revenue Service justified this
assertion by implying a prearranged understanding between the donor and the
beneficiaries that the beneficiaries would not exercise their right to the trust
property. See discussion supra Parts II.E.1.
259. See discussion supra Part V.
260. See discussion supra Part V.
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